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1 Introduction
It is widely reported in the empirical trade literature that changes in international
trade costs substantially affect firm-level decisions on trade, on foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), and on both horizontal and vertical product differentiation; see Atkeson
and Burstein (2010). Modeling both horizontal and vertical product differentiation in
a differentiated Cournot duopoly market, this study scrutinizes the implications of
upstream market power (for high-quality inputs) on a downstream firm’s endogenous
choice of foreign market entry mode and product quality. The endogenous choice of
product quality is modeled as the choice of an input supplier. While low-quality inputs
are provided by a perfectly competitive upstream industry and lead to low-quality dif-
ferentiated products, both high-quality exports and subsidiary sales (the latter of which
warrants also vertical intra-industry trade) require high-quality inputs supplied by a
monopoly upstream firm, and thus are costly. In such an environment, the paper delin-
eates (i) different incentives of exporters and multinationals to penetrate foreign mar-
kets by high-quality products; (ii) variation in input/output prices, sales and markups
between exporters and multinationals; and (iii) how firm-level decisions on the foreign
market entry mode and on the input choice change with changes in relative quality
among varieties, in the degree of product substitutability and in product-specific trade
and transport costs.
There is a large and rapidly growing trade literature relating variation in firm-level
decisions to firm heterogeneity. One strand of this literature focuses on heterogeneity
in firm productivity (e.g., Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004), and its implications on
firm-level decisions (including the optimal foreign market entry mode). In particular,
firms’ investments in R&D, and their intensive use of professional and technical workers
are considered the main source of firm-level economies of scale leading to heterogeneity
at the firm level. The related empirical literature has shown that multinationals are
well represented in capital-intensive and R&D-intensive industries1 and that there is
sorting by productivity: multinationals are, on average, more productive than exporting
firms which are themselves more productive than firms serving only domestic markets.2
1See, for instance, Antràs and Yeaple (2014) for U.S. multinationals, Mayer and Ottaviano (2008)
for French, German, Norwegian and Belgian multinationals, and Navaretti and Venables (2004) for
French, German, Japanese, British and U.S. multinationals.
2See Antràs and Yeaple (2014), Castellani and Giovannetti (2010), Arnold and Hussinger (2010), Aw
and Lee (2008), Mayer and Ottaviano (2008), Castellani and Zanfei (2007), Tomiura (2007), Kimura
and Kiyota (2006), Wagner (2006), Girma et al. (2005; 2004), and Helpman et al. (2004). For a review
of the literature, see Hayakawa et al. (2012), Wagner (2012; 2007), and Greenaway and Kneller (2007).
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While the literature on heterogeneity in firm productivity, to some extent, also studies
horizontal product differentiation, vertical (quality) differentiation is, by and large,
assumed away. In general, the related literature has shown that (i) multinationals’
products can be characterized by higher sophistication (Markusen, 2002; Navaretti
and Venables, 2004); (ii) an exporter’s cost disadvantage (when competing against a
local firm) leads to a less competitive product specification, whereas a multinational
may prefer a more aggressive one (De Fraja and Norman, 2004); and that (iii) trade
liberalization increases exporters’ incentives to invest more in product differentiation
(Schmitt, 1995; Braun, 2008; Bastos and Straume, 2012).
Another strand of the trade literature models heterogeneity in product quality so as to
explain the significantly high share of intra-industry trade in vertically differentiated
products and variation in unit values (among firms, or within firms, across destinations,
etc.) with vertical product differentiation.3 For instance, Anderson and Schmitt (2010)
report a significantly high share of intra-industry trade in vertically differentiated prod-
ucts (e.g., 40% in the EU) and explain this with asymmetric trade liberalization in a
general equilibrium trade model. In particular, the related trade literature has reported
a strong positive correlation between unit values and product quality; see, for example,
Verhoogen (2008); Kugler and Verhoogen (2012); Manova and Zhang (2012); Crozet
et al. (2012); Feenstra and Romalis (2014). This strand of the literature argues that
product quality can be related to firm productivity (e.g., Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011;
Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012), and that (i) higher productivity firms tend to be larger
in terms of sales; (ii) tend to use higher quality inputs and pay more for their inputs;
(iii) tend to produce higher quality products; and thus (iv) tend to charge higher prices
for their exports; for empirical evidence, see Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) using Indian
data; Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) using Colombian data; Manova and Zhang (2012)
using Chinese data.
Building on these different strands of the trade and FDI literature, this study would
like to complement and contribute to the existing literature in the following ways. Most
studies in the related literature rely on nonhomothetic demands, or heterogeneity in
consumer preferences/tastes (so as to capture vertically differentiated traded products),
3Vertical differentiation can be traced back to Linder (1961) and Alchian and Allen (1964). For the
related trade literature on vertical product differentiation see, among others, Falvey and Kierzkowski
(1987), Flam and Helpman (1987), Motta et al. (1997), Toshimutsu (2005), Iacovone and Javorcik
(2010), Anderson and Schmitt (2010), Verhoogen (2008), Johnson (2012), Bastos and Silva (2010),
Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Fajgelbaum et al. (2011), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Crozet et al.
(2012), Manova and Zhang (2012), Amiti and Khandelwal (2013), Antoniades (2015), Feenstra and
Romalis (2014), Bacchiega et al. (2016), Manova and Yu (2017).
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which can be argued to be relevant to certain markets.4 This study, however, looks into
another empirically relevant market segment, simply by focusing on a representative
consumer’s preferences (for both vertically and horizontally differentiated varieties)
represented by a quality-augmented quadratic utility function. The main motivation
behind this is the observation that many households demand (horizontally) differen-
tiated products of different qualities at the same time (e.g., households with multiple
cars and TV-sets of different qualities etc.). Following the related literature, while this
paper also assumes that maintaining high quality warrants quality inputs (e.g., Kugler
and Verhoogen, 2012; Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013) and is costly, it takes a different
approach and models that not all firms are able to manufacture high quality and there
are large frictions against quality upgrading.
The existing trade and FDI literature on vertical product differentiation simplifies firms’
input quality choices and focuses mainly on fixed and/or variable costs of manufactur-
ing high quality.5 This study, however, shows that a number of intuitive results can
be obtained by explicitly modeling both the input choice and frictions against quality
manufacturing. While there are certainly different ways to capture different aspects of
such frictions, the innovation of this study is that it models a potential downstream
exporter’s and a multinational’s input choice under upstream market power. In partic-
ular, the paper considers quality inputs that are highly customized (according to the
needs of a final good producer), and thus are not sold on an organized exchange, nor are
they reference priced in trade publications.6 They are rather produced by a monopoly
upstream firm generating frictions by exercising market power, which renders the high
quality manufacture costly. The empirical motivation is the observation that the share
of differentiated and customized input trade in world trade has increased substantially,
as emphasized by Antrás and Staiger (2012). The related literature predominantly
4Such trade models can be strongly related to the models by Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), Tirole (1988), Choi and Shin (1992), Motta (1993),
Crampes and Hollander (1995), Kim and Kim (1996), Wauthy (1996), and Acharyya (1998; 2005).
5Toshimutsu (2005) shows that if costs of quality improvements are of variable (fixed) type and increas-
ing, then a decrease in imports - by a higher specific tariff - leads to quality upgrading (downgrading).
By the same token, in a heterogeneous firm model, Antoniades (2015) finds that when quality costs
are of fixed type, an increase in market toughness generates two opposing forces, a competition effect
(decreasing prices, markups and quality) and a quality-differentiation effect (increasing those). The
former (latter) dominates for the least (most) productive firms.
6The trade literature distinguishes among inputs that are sold on an exchange (such that the market
for the input is thick with many buyers and sellers), those that are not, but reference priced in
trade publications (such that their market has an intermediate level of thickness), and those that
are neither sold on an exchange, nor reference priced (such that they are highly specialized); see, for
example, Rauch (1999) and Nunn (2007).
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focuses on contract enforcement for highly customized inputs so as to address an im-
portant aspect of such frictions and its implication on exporters’ and multinationals’
decisions; see, among others, Antrás (2003), Antrás and Helpman (2004), Antrás and
Staiger (2012) and Antrás (2016), and references therein. This study thus complements
the related literature by focusing on another important aspect of such frictions, that
is, upstream market power in customized high-quality inputs. Thus modeling frictions
from a different and novel perspective, (i) it provides a further theoretical background
and intuition explaining and qualifying empirical results reported in the related trade
literature (in regards to vertical differentiation and trade); and (ii) it extends discus-
sions to also multinationals and FDI.
The existing literature focuses mainly on exporters and importers in the context of
vertical product differentiation.7 This study thus complements and contributes to the
existing literature by delineating incentives for both exporters and multinationals. By
allowing for both vertical and horizontal product differentiation in a differentiated
Cournot market, this study focuses on the role upstream market power can play for
a downstream foreign firm’s market entry mode choice (trade or FDI) along with its
product quality choice (via choosing a particular input supplier). The downstream firm
has the option to procure high-quality inputs (so as to produce a differentiated high-
quality final good) from a monopoly upstream firm located in Home, or to rely on
a standard input (leading to a differentiated low-quality final good) from a perfectly
competitive upstream industry (either in Home or Foreign) when entering a foreign
market. Upstream market power for high-quality inputs renders production of a differ-
entiated high-quality final good costly and leads to double marginalization. That said,
product quality improves foreign market access. The downstream firm has to bear per-
unit trade costs in the case of exporting the final good to Foreign from Home, which
can be avoided by undertaking FDI. FDI, however, requires fixed investments costs,
and if the downstream firm decides to procure high-quality inputs from Home, then in
addition to fixed FDI costs, it has to pay per-unit trade costs to transfer such inputs
to Foreign (i.e., costs of vertical intra-industry trade).
Relative product quality, the degree of product substitutability and product-specific
trade costs (i) are the key for variation in input/output prices, sales and the markup
between an exporter and a multinational; (ii) are important factors affecting a firm’s
7There are a few papers relying on heterogeneity in consumer preferences so as to model vertical
differentiation and scrutinizing the choice between trade and FDI; see, for example, Motta (1994)
in the context of a single-product firm, and Mai and Zhou (2017) in the context of a multi-product
firm.
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optimal foreign market entry mode and product quality choices; and (iii) have signif-
icant policy implications for high-quality exports and subsidiary sales. The model is
simple and generates a rich set of some intuitive results. For instance, according to the
results, decreasing the degree of product substitutability can undermine positive eco-
nomic virtues of costly quality upgrading, irrespective of the foreign market entry mode,
whereas trade and transport costs have a more involved role. Decreasing trade and/or
transport costs in final goods can promote high-quality exports against low-quality
subsidiary sales especially if relative quality is sufficiently high, which is supported in
equilibrium even for zero fixed investment costs.8 If, however, relative quality is suffi-
ciently low, decreasing trade and/or transport costs in final goods only leads to quality
downgrading by an exporter, while low-quality subsidiary sales dominate in equilibrium
irrespective of trade and transport costs, so long as fixed investment costs are also suf-
ficiently low. In contrast, decreasing input trade and transport costs can lead to quality
upgrading by a subsidiary. If input trade and transport costs decrease faster than those
in final goods, then in equilibrium, high-quality vertical intra-industry trade and sub-
sidiary sales can be promoted against high-quality exports so long as relative quality
is high and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low. In particular, it can be argued
that according to results, there is some scope for using trade policy as an instrument of
quality control, especially when relative quality is sufficiently high. While free trade in
final goods supports high-quality exports, free trade in inputs can support both high-
quality exports and subsidiary sales such that consequently, the level of fixed costs will
determine the equilibrium foreign market entry mode. Also the model is extended to
vertical integration, which clearly shows that double marginalization due to upstream
market power generates significant frictions and makes manufacturing high quality less
likely for both multinationals and exporters (in terms of both fixed investment costs
and trade costs in both inputs and final goods).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3
scrutinizes the optimal sourcing decisions (the product quality choice) of an exporter
and a multinational. Section 4 solves the model for the equilibrium foreign market entry
mode. Section 5 extends the model to vertical integration and delineates the optimal
behavior of the integrated firm. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study. For convenience,
most of the proofs and technical details are relegated to the Appendix.
8Note that when trade costs are positive and there is no fixed investment costs, traditional FDI models
with vertically homogeneous goods predict horizontal FDI (that duplicates the production process in
a foreign country) as the optimal foreign market entry mode based on the proximity-concentration
trade-off; e.g., see Koska (2015).
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2 The model
This study employs a simple differentiated Cournot duopoly model. There are two
countries: Home (H) and Foreign (F ). There is one downstream firm in each country,
namely firms h and f located, respectively, in H and in F . Both countries have per-
fectly competitive upstream industries producing a (standard) low-quality input with
zero marginal cost. In addition, H has also a monopoly upstream firm producing a
high-quality input with zero marginal cost. This asymmetry (in terms of upstream
industries) between H and F follows the observation that a significant number of
countries suffers severely from the lack of resources to generate physical, intellectual
and business know-how (e.g., see Banarjee and Noyak, 2017), and that manufacturing
high-quality inputs/output warrants the use of technologically advanced and sufficient
physical, human and knowledge capital (e.g., see Manova and Zhang, 2012). Also con-
sistent with this, firm f is technologically constrained, and thus uses a low-quality input
and only serves F by a low-quality product. The idea that firm f does not serve H by
its low-quality product is also empirically relevant as some countries (e.g., Japan, the
USA, and the EU) have strict quality standards on imports. For example, Nabin et al.
(2013) report that Chinese automakers (failing some certain crash tests) were not able
to penetrate European markets for long years, or that Indonesian shrimp producers
(lacking some expertise, and thus had to rely on traditional methods) were not able to
meet the zero-chloramphenicol requirement of the EU. This study thus focuses only on
firm h’s market entry in F .
Firm h can serve F either by exports, or via FDI. Exports require per-unit trade and
transport costs in final goods (denoted τ), which can be avoided by undertaking FDI
and paying fixed FDI costs (denoted G). Moreover, firm h can source inputs either
from a perfectly competitive upstream industry (either in H or in F ) and produce a
low-quality product, or from the monopoly upstream firm in H and produce a high-
quality product. If firm h decides to manufacture high quality in the case of FDI, then
it has to pay also per-unit trade and transport costs (denoted t) to transfer high-quality
inputs to F .9 After having obtained inputs (denoted z), firms can produce the final
good (denoted x) according to production function f(z) without any further cost (input
prices are the only production costs for the firms) such that xi = f(z) = z, i = {h, f}.
9Note that this study does not model the transport sector, and thus does not distinguish between
tariffs and transport costs. See Boddin and Stähler (2018) for a model that scrutinizes the transport
sector exercising market power. In this study, both t, τ and G are given, and throughout the paper,
trade-related costs (e.g., tariffs and transport costs) are referred to as trade costs.
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Manufacturing high quality is costly due to upstream market power: high-quality input
price pz is solely determined by the upstream monopoly.
The demand side of the model borrows from Singh and Vives (1984), Häckner (2000)
and Symeonidis (2003), and considers a continuum of consumers of the same type with
a utility function that is separable and linear in the numeraire good (composite goods)
M and quadratic and strictly concave in the consumption of differentiated x-goods. In
particular, the representative consumer maximizes
U(xh, xf ,M) = uhxh + ufxf − x2h/2− x2f/2− σxhxf +M
with respect to the budget constraint
∑
i pixi+M ≤ Y , where Y is income, pi denotes
the price of differentiated good i = {h, f}, and the price of the composite good is
normalized to one. The degree of product substitutability is measured by σ ∈ (0, 1) and
interpreted in terms of horizontal product differentiation as the goods are substitutes.10
Vertical product differentiation is measured by ui, i = {h, f}, such that ui is interpreted
in terms of product quality in a vertical sense.11
The first-order condition of the utility maximization problem
∂U(·)
∂xi
: ui − xi − σxj − pi = 0, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}
leads to the optimal consumption of each variety i = {h, f} of x-good, such that
xi(pi, pj) =
(ui − pi − σ(uj − pj))
(1− σ2)
, i 6= j ∈ {h, f},
in the region {p ∈ R2+ : uh − ph − σ(uf − pf ) > 0, uf − pf − σ(uh − ph) > 0} where the
inverse demand function is linear for each variety i and can be expressed as
pi(xi, xj) = ui − xi − σxj, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}.
It is clear that demand for variety i of x-good is always downward sloping in its own
price and increases with an increase in the price of the rival’s variety.
As for the supply side, the structure is as follows: (i) Firm h chooses the optimal foreign
market entry mode (exports or FDI); then (ii) it decides on the input type (high quality
10Each firm’s market power increases as σ decreases such that if σ = 0, then each firm would have
monopolistic market power, whereas products would be perfect substitutes when there is no vertical
differentiation between the varieties and when σ = 1.
11An increase in ui ceteris paribus increases the marginal utility of good i = {h, f}.
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or low quality) for production by choosing its supplier;12 and finally (iii) both firms (h
and f) compete in a differentiated Cournot duopoly market in F . The model is solved
backwards.
In the last stage (in differentiated Cournot duopoly), each firm maximizes its own
profit, πi = (pi(xi, xj) − ci)xi, i 6= j ∈ {h, f} by simultaneously choosing quantities
xi, i ∈ {h, f}. From the first-order condition of the profit maximization problem, each




(ui − σxj − ci), i 6= j ∈ {h, f},
which can be solved for optimal quantities set by each firm in equilibrium, such that
solving x∗h = xh(x∗f ) and x∗f = xf (x∗h) for x∗h and x∗f leads to
x∗i =
(2(ui − ci)− σ(uj − cj))
(4− σ2)
, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, (1)
in the region of quality spaces where optimal quantities are positive. Using eq.(1), it
is straightforward to show that ∂xi/∂ci < 0, ∂xi/∂cj > 0, and |∂xi/∂ci| > |∂xi/∂cj|,
i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, that is, (i) an increase in the firm’s own cost, or a decrease in the rival’s
cost, decreases the firm’s sales; and (ii) the firm’s sales are more responsive to changes
in its own cost than the rival’s cost. These marginal impacts, however, depend on the
degree of product substitutability, such that ∂2xi/∂ci∂σ < 0, ∂2xi/∂cj∂σ > 0, and that
|∂2xi/∂ci∂σ| < |∂2xi/∂cj∂σ|, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, that is, (i) the marginal impacts of both
the firm’s own and the rival’s costs on the firm’s sales get weaker when the varieties
are less substitutable (when σ is lower); and (ii) this weakening effect is greater in the
case of a change in the rival’s costs.
It is also clear in eq.(1) that ∂xi/∂ui > 0, ∂xi/∂uj < 0 and |∂xi/∂ui| > |∂xi/∂uj|,
i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, that is, (i) an increase in the firm’s own product quality, or a decrease in
the rival’s product quality increases the firm’s sales;13 and (ii) the firm’s sales are more
responsive to changes in its own product quality. These marginal impacts also depend
on the degree of product substitutability, such that ∂2xi/∂ui∂σ > 0, ∂2xi/∂uj∂σ < 0,
and that |∂2xi/∂ui∂σ| < |∂2xi/∂uj∂σ|, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, that is, (i) the marginal impacts
of both the firm’s own and the rival’s product quality on the firm’s sales get weaker
12Changing the sequence such that product quality is chosen before the market entry mode will not
change the results, but will complicate the exposition of the model.
13More precisely, manufacturing higher quality has two effects: a direct demand effect that increases
sales, and an indirect cost effect that decreases sales by increasing production costs. As will be clear
in the following sections, the direct effect dominates for both exporters and multinationals.
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when the varieties are less substitutable (when σ is lower); and (ii) this weakening effect
is greater in the case of a change in the rival’s product quality. Note that while product
quality and costs affect sales in opposite directions, the magnitudes of the marginal
impacts are the same (i.e., |∂xi/∂ci| = |∂xi/∂ui|, i = {h, f}, and |∂xi/∂cj| = |∂xi/∂uj|,
i 6= j ∈ {h, f}): decreasing costs will have the same affect on sales as increasing quality,
so long as the indirect cost effect of a change in quality is negligible. This can be
regarded as a support for the argument in Atkeson and Burstein (2010) that a firm’s
productivity can be interpreted as its product quality, such that the firm innovates to
improve quality rather than to increase productivity.
Substituting the optimal sales given by eq.(1) into the inverse demand function gives
the equilibrium price of each variety, such that
p∗i =
(2ui + (2− σ2)ci − σ(uj − cj))
(4− σ2)
, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}. (2)
Using eq.(2), it is straightforward to show that ∂pi/∂ci > ∂pi/∂cj > 0, i 6= j ∈ {h, f},
that is, (i) an increase in the firm’s own cost, or in the rival’s cost, increases the price
of the firm’s own variety; and (ii) the firm’s own price is more responsive to changes
in its own cost than the rival’s cost. These marginal impacts, however, depend on the
degree of product substitutability, such that ∂2pi/∂ci∂σ < 0, ∂2pi/∂cj∂σ > 0, and that
|∂2pi/∂ci∂σ| < |∂2pi/∂cj∂σ|, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, that is, (i) when the varieties are less
substitutable (when σ is lower), the marginal impact of the firm’s own cost on its own
price gets stronger, whereas the marginal impact of the rival’s cost on the firm’s own
price gets weaker; and (ii) these second-order effects are greater in the case of a change
in the rival’s costs. The following remarks are in order: (i) when the products are less
related, an increase in the firm’s own cost is reflected more on the consumers; (ii) an
increase in the rival’s cost increases the firm’s sales (which decreases the firm’s price),
while decreasing the rival’s sales (which increases the firm’s price); and (iii) as the latter
effect is stronger than the former one (as discussed above), the firm’s price increases
also with an increase in the rival’s cost, although this positive marginal impact gets
weaker when the products are less related.
Similarly, eq.(2) shows that ∂pi/∂ui > 0, ∂pi/∂uj < 0 and |∂pi/∂ui| > |∂pi/∂uj|,
i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, that is, (i) an increase in the firm’s own product quality, or a decrease
in the rival’s product quality increases the firm’s own price;14 and (ii) the firm’s own
price is more responsive to changes in its own product quality. These marginal im-
14More precisely, manufacturing higher quality has two effects (a direct demand effect and an indirect
cost effect) both of which will increase prices.
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pacts also depend on the degree of product substitutability, such that ∂2pi/∂ui∂σ > 0,
∂2pi/∂uj∂σ < 0, and that |∂2pi/∂ui∂σ| < |∂2pi/∂uj∂σ|, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, that is, (i)
the marginal impacts of both the firm’s own and the rival’s product quality on the
firm’s own price get weaker when the varieties are less substitutable (when σ is lower);
and (ii) this weakening effect is greater in the case of a change in the rival’s product
quality. Note that (i) the firm’s own price increases more with an increase in its own
product quality than its own cost (∂pi/∂ui > ∂pi/∂ci > 0, i = {h, f}); and (ii) the
rival’s product quality and cost affect the firm’s own price in the same magnitude and
in opposite directions (i.e., |∂pi/∂cj| = |∂pi/∂uj|, i 6= j ∈ {h, f}, that is, increasing the
rival’s cost will have the same affect on the firm’s own price as decreasing the rival’s
quality, so long as the indirect cost effect of a change in quality is negligible.
Another important measure is a firm’s markup over marginal costs, denoted ψi =
(p∗i − ci)/ci, i ∈ {h, f}. While eq.(2) shows that a firm with a higher cost, or in a
less competitive environment will charge a higher price, a firm’s markup (i) increases
with a decrease in the firm’s own cost (∂ψi/∂ci < 0), and this increase is even greater
when the firm’s product quality is higher (∂2ψi/∂ci∂ui < 0), or in a less competitive
environment, such that when the rival has higher costs (∂2ψi/∂ci∂cj < 0) or lower
product quality (∂2ψi/∂ci∂uj > 0). Similarly, a firm’s markup increases also (i) with
an increase in the rival’s cost (∂ψi/∂cj > 0) (though it is less responsive to the rival’s
cost than its own cost such that |∂ψi/∂cj| < |∂ψi/∂ci|); or (ii) with an increase in the
firm’s own product quality (∂ψi/∂ui > 0) or with a decrease in the rival’s product
quality (∂ψi/∂uj < 0). While a firm’s markup is more responsive to changes in its
own product quality than those in the rival’s product quality (|∂ψi/∂ui| > |∂ψi/∂uj|),
the marginal impacts of changes in product quality (or in the rival’s cost) on a firm’s
markup are even stronger when the degree of product substitutability is higher (as
∂2ψi/∂ui∂σ > 0, ∂2ψi/∂uj∂σ < 0, and ∂2ψi/∂cj∂σ > 0). Moreover, all these marginal
impacts and their changes are even stronger for a firm with a lower marginal cost. It
should be noted in this model that (p∗i − ci), i ∈ {h, f} can be interpreted in terms
of price distortions over marginal costs, where (p∗i − ci) = x∗i , i ∈ {h, f} and thus the
equilibrium operating profits can be expressed as π∗i = (x∗i )2. Given these discussions, it
is now clear that some of the findings reported in the related literature (as is discussed
in Section 1) can easily be obtained also in this simple model, such that
Lemma 1 Firms with lower marginal costs tend to be larger in terms of sales, tend
to charge lower prices and higher markups, and tend to earn higher operating profits.
Increasing their product quality increases sales, prices, markups and operating profits.
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The first part of Lemma 1 holds true also for heterogeneous firm models of trade
without vertical differentiation, whereas the last part is specific to those with vertical
differentiation (e.g., see Manova and Zhang, 2012). As is discussed by Section 1, a
similar finding is presented by several studies relying on monopolistic competition and
constant elasticities and/or on heterogeneity in consumer preferences. Lemma 1 simply
extends this to oligopoly in a representative consumer framework, where preferences
for differentiated products are represented by a quality-augmented quadratic utility
function. Different from the existing literature, however, the next section will show
that upstream market power for high-quality inputs will have important implications
on the input (product quality) choice of exporters and multinationals.
3 Sourcing product quality
Exporters and multinationals are exposed to different types of costs, which affect not
only their sales but also their product quality choice by changing their input costs,
especially when there is upstream market power for high-quality inputs. Similar to
traditional models of trade and horizontal FDI, in this model, trade costs in final goods
generate a cost disadvantage for exporters, while multinationals can avoid such costs by
paying fixed investment costs and locating a subsidiary in a foreign country (e.g., see
Markusen, 2002; Navaretti and Venables, 2004, and references therein). Multinationals,
however, may have to bear also costs of vertical intra-industry trade, especially if they
have to import certain inputs for a subsidiary in a foreign country. In this model,
upstream market power for high-quality inputs renders manufacturing high quality
costly both for an exporter and a multinational. In addition, given high-quality inputs
are available only in H, a multinational has to pay per-unit input trade costs to transfer
high-quality inputs to its subsidiary in F .
3.1 Quality choice by a multinational
Suppose in the first stage, firm h has chosen to locate a subsidiary in F . In the second
stage, if firm h prefers to manufacture low quality by relying on inputs produced by
the perfectly competitive upstream industry, then ch = cf = 0; uh = uf = u, where u
represents the product quality level when low-quality inputs are used in production.15
15Given positive input trade costs, in such a case, firm h will source low-quality inputs from the
perfectly competitive upstream industry located in F .
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Substituting these into equations (1) and (2), the price of firm h’s variety, its sales and
profits from manufacturing low quality in F in equilibrium can be expressed as:
ph = xh =
u
2 + σ






It is clear from eq.(3) that an increase in u, or in the degree of horizontal differentiation
(such that σ is lower), increases firm h’s price, sales and profits. This case is similar
to FDI models with only horizontal differentiation as there is no quality difference
between the foreign and local varieties (respectively, the first and the second argument
in parenthesis in the profit function, πFDIh (·, ·)).
If, however, firm h opts for a high-quality output, then the local and foreign varieties
will be of different quality. In this case, given firm h is a multinational, it has to transfer
high-quality inputs from H to its subsidiary in F after having obtained inputs from
the monopoly upstream firm in H. Thus, ch = pz + t and cf = 0; uh = u and uf = u,
where pz is the input price determined by the monopoly upstream firm, t is the per-unit
input trade cost, and u represents the product quality level when high-quality inputs
are used in production (such that u > u). Substituting these into eq. (1), firm h’s sales
xh, given by eq.(1), can be expressed as a function of the input price. Note that high-
quality inputs produced by the upstream monopoly are highly customized according
to the needs of the downstream multinational, whose product in F shall be regarded
as country specific: its product for H does not affect the price of this specific input.
Given xh = f(z) = z, substituting z for xh and re-arranging the expression, the inverse
input demand can be written as pz(z) = (2u− σu− 2t− (4− σ2)z)/2. The upstream









In eq.(4), z∗ also corresponds to vertical intra-industry trade. Both the high-quality
input price and sales increase with a decrease in input trade costs t, or with an increase
(decrease) in firm h’s (the rival’s) product quality. As might be expected, firm h’s costs,
ch = pz + t = (2u− σu+ 2t)/4, increase with an increase in t, with an increase in the
degree of horizontal product differentiation (with a decrease in σ), or with an increase
(decrease) in firm h’s (the rival’s) product quality.
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It is now straightforward to show that, in equilibrium:
ph =












Note that throughout the study, only non-prohibitive trade costs are considered such
that the equilibrium prices and quantities are positive. Thus, t < t = u − (σu)/2.
Comparing prices given by equations (3) and (5), it can be shown that for any non-
prohibitive t, a multinational charges a higher price for a high-quality product than
for a low-quality product, and that the high-quality product price increases with an
increase in t. High-quality sales, given by eq.(5), are, however, greater than low-quality
sales only for sufficiently low input trade costs and for sufficiently high relative quality.16
The following result is, thus, immediate:
Proposition 1 A multinational prefers a high-quality product over a low-quality one
only when 0 ≤ t < ((u− u)− (u− (σu/2))), insofar as (u/u) > (4− σ)/2. If, however,
(u/u) < (4 − σ)/2, then for any t < t, relying on low-quality inputs and engaging in
low-quality subsidiary sales are more profitable than high-quality subsidiary sales for a
multinational.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 shows that a sufficiently high quality difference is a necessary (but not
a sufficient) condition for a multinational entering a foreign market by a high-quality
product. The following remarks are in order. Decreasing t decreases costs more than
high-quality output prices; for a sufficiently high quality difference, both price distor-
tions (above marginal costs) and total sales are greater when t is decreased sufficiently.
Input trade liberalization encourages a multinational for a high-quality output and
vertical intra-industry trade in high-quality inputs only for a sufficiently high quality
difference. By contrast, an increase in the degree of horizontal product differentiation (a
decrease in σ) warrants even a higher quality difference to support manufacturing high
quality by a multinational, and thus discourages quality upgrade by a multinational.
The positive correlation between trade costs (distance) and quality of the traded goods
reported in the literature (e.g., see Bacchiega et al., 2006) does not extend to vertical
intra-industry trade in high-quality inputs by multinationals.
16Throughout the study, a sufficiently high quality difference or relative quality is referred to as the
condition that (u/u) > (4− σ)/2 ⇐⇒ (u− u)− (u− (σu/2)) > 0.
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3.2 Quality choice by an exporter
Suppose now in the first stage, firm h has chosen to export its product to F . As in the
previous section, in the second stage, if firm h prefers to export low quality by relying
on inputs produced by the perfectly competitive upstream industry in H, then ch = τ
and cf = 0; uh = uf = u, where τ is the per-unit trade cost of exporting final goods.
Substituting these into equations (1) and (2), the price of firm h’s variety, its exports





















where superscript T stands for trade. Note that throughout the study, only non-
prohibitive trade costs are considered such that the equilibrium prices and quantities
are positive. Thus, τ < τ = u − (σu)/2. It is clear from eq.(6) that an increase in u,
or in the degree of horizontal differentiation (such that σ is lower), increases firm h’s
price, sales and profits. Comparing equations (3) and (6), it can be shown that also in
this model, there is a tariff-jumping motive by a multinational, such that an exporter’s
cost disadvantage (due to trade costs τ) decreases sales and price distortions (above
marginal costs) by 2τ/(4−σ2), which is greater with a higher τ or with higher product
substitutability (with higher σ). This case is similar to oligopolistic models of trade
with only horizontal differentiation as there is no quality difference between the traded
and local varieties (respectively, the first and the second argument in parenthesis in
the profit function, πTh (·, ·)).
If, however, firm h opts for a high-quality output, then the local and traded varieties
will be of different quality. In this case, firm h is an exporter and pays trade costs in
final goods, denoted τ , in addition to the input price, denoted pz, determined by the
monopoly upstream firm. Thus, ch = pz+τ and cf = 0; uh = u and uf = u. Substituting
these into eq. (1), firm h’s exports xh, given by eq.(1), can be expressed as a function
of the input price. Note that, as in the case of a downstream multinational, high-
quality inputs produced by the upstream monopoly are highly customized according
to the needs of the downstream exporter, whose product in F shall be regarded as
country specific: its product for H does not affect the price of this specific input. Given
xh = f(z) = z, substituting z for xh and re-arranging the expression, the inverse input
demand can be written as pz(z) = (2u−σu−2τ−(4−σ2)z)/2. The upstream monopoly
15








In eq.(7), both the high-quality input price and sales increase with a decrease in trade
costs in final goods, τ , or with an increase (decrease) in firm h’s (the rival’s) product
quality. As might be expected, firm h’s costs, ch = pz+ τ = (2u−σu+2τ)/4, increases
with an increase in τ , with an increase in the degree of horizontal product differentiation
(with a decrease in σ), or with an increase (decrease) in firm h’s (the rival’s) product
quality.
It is now straightforward to show that, in equilibrium:
ph =












Notice that in this model, the difference between an exporter and a multinational pro-
ducing a high-quality product is mainly determined by differences in product-specific
trade costs. Comparing equations (5) and (8), it can easily be shown that
Proposition 2 Variation in input prices, sales and price distortions (above marginal
costs) between an exporter and a multinational results from differences in product-
specific trade costs (i.e., input trade costs vs. trade costs in final goods). If τ > t, then
(compared to a multinational sourcing high-quality inputs from a monopoly supplier in
H), an exporter of a high-quality product
• demands less inputs from the monopoly supplier in H, and pays (τ − t)/2 less,
• distorts prices (above marginal costs) less and decreases sales by (τ − t)/(4−σ2).
The greater the difference between trade costs in inputs and in final goods, the greater
these decreases. Given such a cost disadvantage of the exporter, its price distortions
and sales decrease even more if the traded and local varieties are more substitutable
(higher σ), although for any σ ∈ (0, 1), these decreases are less than those in input
prices paid by the exporter.
16
Also, comparing prices given by equations (6) and (8), it can be shown that for any
non-prohibitive τ (such that τ < τ), an exporter charges a higher price for a high-
quality product than for a low-quality product. Both the high-quality and the low-
quality product price increase with an increase in τ , although the low-quality product
price increases twice as much as the increase in the high-quality product price due
to double marginalization in the high-quality product price. This implies that the
difference between the high-quality and the low-quality product price decreases with
an increase in trade costs. Moreover, high-quality exports, given by eq.(8), are greater
than low-quality exports for any τ < τ so long as there is sufficiently high relative
quality. If, however, the quality difference between the local and traded varieties is
small, then only for a sufficiently high trade cost, high-quality exports are greater than
low-quality exports. The following result is, thus, immediate:
Proposition 3 An exporter prefers a high-quality product over a low-quality one for
any τ < τ insofar as (u/u) > (4 − σ)/2. If, however, (u/u) < (4 − σ)/2, then relying
on high-quality inputs and exporting high quality is more profitable than exporting low
quality only when (u− (σu/2)− (u− u)) < τ < τ .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3 shows that a sufficiently high quality difference is not necessary, though
is sufficient for an exporter selling a high-quality product in a foreign market. The
following remarks are in order. Decreasing τ decreases costs more than high-quality
output prices; for a sufficiently high quality difference, or for a small quality difference
and sufficiently high τ , both price distortions (above marginal costs) and total sales are
greater. Trade liberalization in final goods does not contribute much to an exporter’s
incentives to produce a high-quality output; it may even discourage an exporter to
produce a high-quality product, especially when relative quality is sufficiently low. The
reason is that an exporter’s input demand will increase with a decrease in trade costs,
which will lead the upstream monopoly to increase the input price. When relative
quality and trade costs are both sufficiently low, the benefit from a costly quality
upgrade falls short of the increase in the exporter’s costs due to double marginalization.
If, however, trade costs in final goods are sufficiently high, and thus an exporter’s input
demand and sales will be sufficiently small, it will pay off for the exporter to upgrade
quality as the costs will not be that high. By the same token, the positive correlation
between trade costs (distance) and product quality reported in the literature (e.g., see
Bacchiega et al., 2006) is confirmed only when relative quality is sufficiently low.
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It is now clear from Propositions (1)-(3) that
Proposition 4 A higher degree of horizontal product differentiation can undermine a
firm’s effort of costly quality upgrading, irrespective of the foreign market entry mode.
As in the case of a multinational discussed in the previous section, also for an exporter,
an increase in the degree of horizontal product differentiation (a decrease in σ) is pit-
ted against quality upgrading. A higher degree of horizontal product differentiation
warrants even a higher quality difference to support exporting high quality, and thus
can discourage quality upgrading also by an exporter, especially if trade costs in final
goods are also sufficiently low. Proposition 4 implies that vertical and horizontal prod-
uct differentiation are, to some extent, substitute activities. When local and foreign
varieties are more substitutable, competition will be more intense encouraging firms
to differentiate product quality so as to decrease competition intensity. An empiri-
cal prediction that follows Proposition 4 is that quality differentiation among products
might be prevalent in industries with a higher degree of product substitutability among
product varieties.
4 Foreign market entry
This section scrutinizes the equilibrium foreign market entry mode of firm h, which is
determined in the first stage. It is now clear from the above discussions that relative
product quality, product substitutability, and product-specific trade costs play a crucial
role in firm-level decisions. This section, thus, distinguishes between two cases: high
vs. low relative product quality of the foreign variety.
4.1 High relative product quality
Suppose that higher-quality inputs provided by the monopoly upstream firm are such
that the quality difference between the local and foreign varieties is sufficiently high:
(u/u) > (4−σ)/2. Proposition 1 has already shown that in such a case, a multinational
prefers high-quality subsidiary sales only for sufficiently low input trade costs, such that
πFDIh (u, ·) > πFDIh (u, ·) if t < ((u − u) − (u − (σu/2))).17 By contrast, Proposition 3
17Note that the second argument that is represented by a center-dot (·) in the profit function is simply
the local variety’s product quality (u).
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has shown that in such a case, an exporter prefers to produce and sell a high-quality
product over a low-quality one for any non-prohibitive trade costs in final goods, such
that πTh (u, ·) > πTh (u, ·) for any τ < τ . Thus firm h has to compare πFDIh (u, ·) and
πTh (u, ·) for low values of input trade costs (to the left of the vertical line depicted at
t = ((u−u)−(u−(σu/2))) in Figures 1 and 2), while comparing πFDIh (u, ·) and πTh (u, ·)
for high values of input trade costs (to the right of the vertical line depicted at t =
((u−u)−(u−(σu/2))) in Figures 1 and 2).18 To illustrate the results, both Figures 1 and
2 confine the relevant area such that trade costs are non-prohibitive, that is, the area
below the dashed-line τ = u− (σu/2) and to the left of the dashed-line t = u− (σu/2).
Note that in Figure 1, although there is high relative quality, it is not substantial such
that (4− σ)/2 < u/u < (3− σ), and thus τ = u− (σu/2) > ((u− u)− (u− (σu/2))).
By contrast, Figure 2 illustrates the cases where relative quality is substantially high
such that u/u > (3− σ). Thus, in Figure 2, τ = u− (σu/2) < ((u− u)− (u− (σu/2)))
which implies that any non-prohibitive trade cost in final goods will already be below
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Figure 1: Relative product quality: (4− σ)/2 < u/u < (3− σ)
18In all Figures, the second argument in the profit function, which represents the local variety’s product
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Figure 2: Relative product quality: u/u > (3− σ)
It is clear that low-quality subsidiary sales can emerge as the equilibrium outcome
when relative quality is high, but not substantial (see the hatched area - the upper
right corner - in Figure 1). In such a case, low-quality subsidiary sales are supported
in equilibrium, especially if both trade costs in inputs and final goods are sufficiently
high, and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low, such that G < G1. If, however,
relative quality is substantial, as is illustrated by Figure 2, such that u/u > (3 − σ),
in equilibrium, manufacturing high quality will be optimal for both multinationals and
exporters. In such a case, high-quality exports dominate subsidiary sales of any quality
so long as trade costs in final goods are below those in inputs, such that τ < t. That said,
high-quality subsidiary sales can also emerge as the equilibrium outcome, especially if
input trade costs are below trade costs in final goods (the area above the 45-degree
line where τ > t), and if fixed investment costs are sufficiently low, such that G < G2.
These results hold true also for the case that relative product quality is high (but not
substantial) as is illustrated by Figure 1, such that (4−σ)/2 < u/u < (3−σ), although
they hold true only for certain values of input trade costs. In particular, the case that
τ > t holds is likely, especially if trade costs are interpreted as physical (transportation)
costs; e.g., transporting a final good, such as a car, will be more costly than transporting
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only inputs, such as the engine or seats of the car. Proposition 5 summarizes the
findings for all possible equilibrium foreign market entry modes depending on different
constellations of parameter values of t and τ , such that
Proposition 5 When relative quality is sufficiently high such that (u/u) > (4− σ)/2,
in equilibrium,
• for sufficiently high trade costs in both inputs and final goods, such that (t, τ) >>
((u−u)−(u−(σu/2))), low-quality subsidiary sales are optimal if fixed investment
costs are sufficiently low, such that G < G1 (or high-quality exports if G > G1);
• given sufficiently high input trade costs, if trade costs in final goods decrease
sufficiently such that τ < ((u − u) − (u − (σu/2))) < t, then exporting a high-
quality variety is optimal, irrespective of fixed investment costs;
• if both trade costs decrease sufficiently, while those in final goods decrease faster,
such that τ < t < ((u−u)−(u−(σu/2))), although a multinational would upgrade
quality, exporting high quality is optimal, irrespective of fixed investment costs;
• given sufficiently low input trade costs, if trade costs in final goods are higher
(if t < ((u − u) − (u − (σu/2))) and τ > t), then high-quality subsidiary sales
are optimal if fixed investment costs are sufficiently low, such that G < G2 (or
high-quality exports if G > G2).
Proof. See Figures 1 and 2, and Appendix A.3.
Note that for the first bullet point in Proposition 5, Appendix A.3 shows that in the
relevant range of trade costs, such that (t, τ) >> ((u − u) − (u − (σu/2))), threshold
fixed investment cost G1 increases with trade costs in final goods, τ . Assuming that
relative quality is not substantial, such that (4 − σ)/2 < u/u < (3 − σ), the higher
the non-prohibitive trade costs in final goods, the higher the fixed investment cost
threshold, below which low-quality subsidiary sales are supported in equilibrium. That
is, in the hatched area in Figure 1 (the upper right corner), as trade costs in final goods
increase further, the probability of low-quality subsidiary sales increases. Similarly, as
for the last bullet point in Proposition 5, Appendix A.3 shows that in the relevant
range of trade costs, such that τ > t (the area above the 45-degree line in both Figures
1 and 2), the higher the trade costs in final goods above input trade costs - the higher
is (τ − t) - the higher the fixed investment cost threshold, below which high-quality
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subsidiary sales are preferred over high-quality exports. In particular, threshold fixed
investment cost G2 increases with a decrease in input trade costs t, whereas it increases
with an increase in trade costs in final goods, τ . Thus the probability of high-quality
subsidiary sales increases as the difference between trade costs in final goods and those
in inputs increases further.
It is immediate from Proposition 5 that when relative quality is high, trade liberaliza-
tion in final goods (decreasing τ) can promote high-quality exports against low-quality
subsidiary sales even for zero fixed investment costs. This holds true also against high-
quality subsidiary sales: while input trade liberalization can lead to quality upgrading
by a multinational, if trade costs in final goods decrease faster than those in inputs,
then high-quality exports are preferred also over high-quality subsidiary sales, even for
zero fixed investment costs. In particular, these results stand in stark contrast to FDI
models without vertical product differentiation, where FDI emerges as the equilibrium
foreign market entry mode under zero fixed investment costs and positive trade costs.
If, however, input trade costs decrease faster than those in final goods, then high-quality
vertical intra-industry trade and high-quality subsidiary sales can be promoted against
high-quality exports so long as relative quality is high and fixed investment costs are
sufficiently low. Therefore, consistent with the trade literature discussed in Section 1,
also in this model, asymmetric product-specific trade liberalization has some important
implications on firm-level decisions.
4.2 Low relative product quality
Suppose now that higher-quality inputs provided by the monopoly upstream firm are
such that the quality difference between the local and foreign varieties is sufficiently low:
(u/u) < (4−σ)/2. Proposition 1 has already shown that in such a case, a multinational
prefers manufacturing low quality in F for any non-prohibitive input trade costs, such
that πFDIh (u) > πFDIh (u) for any t < t. By contrast, Proposition 3 has shown that in
such a case, an exporter prefers to produce and sell a high-quality product over a low-
quality one only for sufficiently high trade costs in final goods, such that πTh (u) > πTh (u)
if ((u − (σu/2)) − (u − u)) < τ < τ . Thus, in such a case, firm h has to compare
πFDIh (u) and πTh (u) for low values of trade costs in final goods (below the horizontal
line depicted at τ = ((u−(σu/2))−(u−u)) in Figure 3), while comparing πFDIh (u) and
πTh (u) for high values of trade costs in final goods (above the horizontal line depicted at
τ = ((u−(σu/2))−(u−u)) in Figure 3). As in Figures 1 and 2, to illustrate the results,
Figure 3 confines the relevant area such that trade costs are non-prohibitive. Given that
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Figure 3: Relative product quality: u/u < (4− σ)/2
Figure 3 clearly shows that when relative product quality is low, such that u/u <
(4 − σ)/2, trade costs in final goods and fixed investment costs mainly determine the
equilibrium outcome, as in the standard FDI literature. For sufficiently high trade costs
in final goods, low-quality subsidiary sales are supported in equilibrium, especially if
fixed investment costs are sufficiently low, such that G < G3. Note that as is shown
by Appendix A.4, threshold fixed investment cost G3 increases with an increase in
trade costs in final goods, τ . Thus, an increase in trade costs in final goods in the
shaded area in Figure 3 (the upper rectangle) increases the probability of low-quality
subsidiary sales. Similarly, for sufficiently low trade costs in final goods, low-quality
subsidiary sales are also supported in equilibrium, especially if fixed investment costs
are sufficiently low, such that G < G4. Appendix A.4 shows that threshold fixed in-
vestment cost G4 also increases with an increase in trade costs in final goods, τ . Thus,
although an increase in trade costs in final goods encourages an exporter to upgrade
quality when relative quality is sufficiently low, the probability of low-quality subsidiary
sales increases with such an increase (as both G3 and G4 are positively related to τ).
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Proposition 6 summarizes all possible equilibrium foreign market entry modes depend-
ing on different constellations of parameter values of t and τ , such that
Proposition 6 When relative quality is sufficiently low such that (u/u) < (4 − σ)/2,
in equilibrium,
• for sufficiently high trade costs in final goods, (u − (σu/2) − (u − u)) < τ < τ ,
low-quality subsidiary sales are optimal for sufficiently low fixed investment costs,
such that G < G3 (or high-quality exports if G > G3);
• for sufficiently low trade costs in final goods, such that τ < (u−(σu/2)−(u−u)),
low-quality subsidiary sales are optimal for sufficiently low fixed investment costs,
such that G < G4 (or low-quality exports if G > G4).
Proof. See Figure 3 and Appendix A.4.
It is immediate from Proposition 6 that when relative quality and fixed investment
costs are sufficiently low, decreasing trade costs in final goods only leads to quality
downgrading by an exporter, while low-quality subsidiary sales dominate irrespective
of input trade costs (so long as they are non-prohibitive).
5 Vertical integration
In this section, the model is extended to vertical integration so as to flash out the role
upstream market power plays in the optimal foreign market entry mode and product
quality. In the case of vertical integration, there is no double marginalization, and high-
quality inputs can be procured at zero marginal cost (from the integrated upstream
firm). If the integrated firm has chosen to locate a subsidiary in F , then it pays input
trade costs t to transfer high-quality inputs from H to its subsidiary in F so as to
manufacture high quality in F . Thus ch = t, cf = 0, and uh = u, uf = u. Substituting
these into equations (1) and (2), the price of high-quality foreign variety, the integrated
firm’s sales and profits in F in equilibrium can be expressed as:
pvh =













where superscript v stands for the case of vertical integration.
If, however, the integrated firm has chosen to manufacture in H and to export high-
quality final goods to F , then it pays τ to export final goods from H to F . Thus ch = τ ,
cf = 0, and uh = u, uf = u. Substituting these into equations (1) and (2), the price of
high-quality foreign variety, the integrated firm’s sales and profits in F in equilibrium
can be expressed as:
pvh =












Comparing eq.(9) with eq.(5), and eq.(10) with eq.(8) reveals that, as might be ex-
pected, irrespective of the foreign market entry mode, vertical integration between the
monopoly upstream and the downstream firm increases (doubles) the foreign firm’s
sales and decreases its price. That said, vertical integration leads to higher price dis-
tortions around marginal costs as the decrease in the high-quality input price is greater
than the decrease in the final goods price.19 Also, as might be expected, vertical inte-
gration can be mutually beneficial as the joint firm profits under vertical integration
are greater than the sum of independent firm profits under upstream market power.20
Comparing profits given by eq.(9) and eq.(3) shows that for a vertically integrated
multinational, manufacturing a high-quality product in F is more profitable than opting
for a low-quality product, so long as, for any given relative quality, input trade costs
are less than the quality difference between the foreign and the local variety (i.e.,
t < u− u). It is straightforward to introduce variable or fixed costs specific to vertical
integration such that in the case of variable costs, input trade costs should be replaced
by ch = c + t in πv,FDIh (u, u) given by eq.(9), or in the case of fixed costs, C can be
19A similar exercise can be carried out for the local firm, in which case, it is straightforward to
show that vertical integration between the monopoly upstream and the downstream foreign firm (i)
decreases local sales; (ii) increases the price of the low-quality local variety; (iii) increases aggregate
sales in F (as the increase in the sales of the high-quality foreign variety is greater than the decrease
in the low-quality local variety); and (iv) decreases local profits.
20It should be noted that the individual benefits from vertical integration depend on each firm’s
bargaining power and on each firm’s disagreement profits (threat points), especially if generalized
Nash bargaining is employed to determine how the firms share the gains from vertical integration.
That said, replacing upstream market power by bargaining power, however, generates qualitatively
the same results as in Sections 3 and 4 (computations are available upon request). Thus, to better
highlight the role of upstream market power in a foreign firm’s product quality and market entry
mode choice, in this section, only the integrated firm is considered.
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included in (subtracted from) πv,FDIh (u, u) given by eq.(9). Comparing those and eq.(3)
then leads to the following result.
Proposition 7 A multinational tends to opt for quality upgrade via vertical integration
(i) if the quality difference between the local and the foreign varieties is large enough
to cover input trade costs (i.e., t < u − u); or (ii) if the integrated multinational
has sufficiently low marginal costs c < u − u − t (when vertical integration warrants
additional variable costs); or (iii) if the integrated firm has sufficiently low fixed costs
along with low input trade costs and variable costs, especially when vertical integration
warrants also additional fixed costs.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
It is now clear from Propositions 1 and 7 that avoiding double marginalization (due to
upstream market power) by vertical integration enables the integrated multinational to
manufacture high quality also for low relative quality and for higher input trade costs.
Moreover, Proposition 7 suggests that there may be sorting for product quality such
that more productive multinationals may opt for higher quality products in countries
where input trade costs are sufficiently low. Or to put it differently, more productive
multinationals can handle higher input trade costs when upgrading product quality,
which is consistent with the findings of the related literature. In contrast to a multi-
national, comparing eq.(10) and eq.(6) shows that a vertically integrated exporter’s
profits are greater with a high-quality product than with a low-quality product, irre-
spective of (non-prohibitive) trade costs or relative product quality. As in the case of a
multinational, also for an exporter, it is straightforward to introduce variable and/or
fixed costs specific to vertical integration such that in the case of variable costs, trade
costs in final goods in πv,Th (u, u) given by eq.(10) should be replaced by ch = c+ τ , or
in the case of fixed costs, C can be included in (subtracted from) πv,Th (u, u) given by
eq.(10). Comparing those and eq.(6) then leads to the following result.
Proposition 8 An exporter tends to opt for quality upgrade via vertical integration for
any given (non-prohibitive) trade costs in final goods insofar as the quality difference
between the local and the foreign varieties is large enough to cover variable costs that
might have arisen due to vertical integration (i.e., c < u−u) and/or fixed costs resulting
from vertical integration are sufficiently low.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
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While the integrated exporter’s behavior is the same as in the case of upstream market
power, especially when relative quality is sufficiently high (see the first part of Proposi-
tion 3), avoiding double marginalization enables the integrated exporter to manufacture
high quality also for a low quality difference, irrespective of trade costs in final goods.
Moreover, similar to Proposition 7, Proposition 8 suggests that there may be sorting
for product quality also for an exporter such that more productive exporters may opt
for higher quality products. Also comparing equations (9) and (10) shows that, as in
the case of no vertical integration but upstream market power,
Proposition 9 Variation in input prices, sales and price distortions (above marginal
costs) between an integrated exporter and an integrated multinational results from dif-
ferences in product-specific trade costs (i.e., input trade costs vs. trade costs in final
goods). If τ > t, then (compared to an integrated multinational manufacturing high
quality), an integrated exporter of a high-quality product distorts prices (above marginal
costs) less and decreases sales by 2(τ − t)/(4 − σ2) (double the decrease compared to
the case of no vertical integration). This decrease is greater the greater is the difference
between trade costs in inputs and in final goods, or the lower is the degree of product
differentiation (the higher is σ).
When is quality upgrading through vertical integration optimal in equilibrium? Given
the results in Propositions 7 and 8, to decide on the equilibrium firm behavior: (i) when
input trade costs are sufficiently low such that t < (u − u), a potential (integrated)
multinational’s optimal behavior (that is to vertically integrate and manufacture high
quality) and profits (πv,FDIh (u, u) given by eq.(9)) should be compared with a potential
(integrated) exporter’s optimal behavior (that is to vertically integrate and manufac-
ture high quality) and profits (πv,Th (u, u) given by eq.(10)); and (ii) when input trade
costs are sufficiently high such that t > (u−u), a potential (integrated) multinational’s
optimal behavior (that is to rely on low-quality inputs and manufacture low quality)
and profits (πFDIh (u, u) given by eq.(3)) should be compared with a potential (inte-
grated) exporter’s optimal behavior (that is to vertically integrate and manufacture
high quality) and profits (πv,Th (u, u) given by eq.(10)). This leads to
Proposition 10 The equilibrium firm behavior is such that
• When t > u− u, exporting high quality is optimal for any fixed investment costs
G ≥ 0 if (and only if) τ < u − u. If, however, also τ > u − u, then exporting
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through vertical integration is optimal (compared to low-quality subsidiary sales)
only for sufficiently high fixed investment costs G > G5.
• When t < u−u, manufacturing high quality through vertical integration is optimal
and the integrated firm prefers exporting over FDI for any fixed investment costs
G ≥ 0 so long as τ < t. If, however, τ > t, then the integrated firm prefers
exporting over FDI only for sufficiently high fixed investment costs G > G6.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Also in this case, relative quality of the foreign variety is important for the equilibrium
firm outcome as is illustrated by Figure 4 (where relative quality is sufficiently but not
substantially high such that (4 − σ)/2 < u/u < (3 − σ)), by Figure 5 (where relative
quality is substantially high such that u/u > (3− σ)), and by Figure 6 (where relative
quality is sufficiently low such that (4 − σ)/2 > u/u). As in the previous section, in
all figures in this section, only non-prohibitive trade costs are illustrated such that
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Figure 4: Vertical integration; Relative product quality: (4− σ)/2 < u/u < (3− σ)
When relative quality is high such that (u − u) > (u − (σu/2)), any non-prohibitive
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Figure 5: Vertical integration; Relative product quality: u/u > (3− σ)
difference between the two varieties such that τ < (u − u). Thus, as is given by the
first bullet point in Proposition 10, when t > (u − u), in equilibrium, the integrated
firm prefers exporting its high-quality variety over subsidiary sales, even for zero fixed
investment costs. The reason is simply high input trade costs. While decreasing input
trade costs encourages a multinational to upgrade the quality of its variety, high-quality
subsidiary sales through vertical integration will emerge as the equilibrium outcome
only for sufficiently low input trade costs (such that t < τ) and for sufficiently low fixed
investment costs (such that G < G6). As in the case of upstream market power, under
vertical integration, the higher the trade costs in final goods above input trade costs -
the higher is (τ − t) - the higher the fixed investment cost threshold, below which high-
quality subsidiary sales are preferred over high-quality exports. In particular, threshold
fixed investment cost G6 increases with a decrease in input trade costs t, whereas it
increases with an increase in trade costs in final goods, τ (see Appendix A.7). Thus the
probability of high-quality subsidiary sales increases as the difference between trade
costs in final goods and those in inputs increases further.
Figures 4 and 5 clearly show that when relative quality is sufficiently high, avoiding
double marginalization by vertical integration and manufacturing high quality are op-
29
πFDIh (u) > π
v,T
h (u) if G < G5
πv,Th (u) > π
FDI












πv,FDIh (u) > π
v,T
h (u)
if G < G6 = 4G2




(τ = u− u)
t = (u− u)




h (u) < π
FDI
h (u)
Figure 6: Vertical Integration; Relative product quality: u/u < (4− σ)/2
timal for any constellation of trade and fixed investment costs. The choice is simply the
optimal foreign market entry mode (exports vs. FDI), which is determined by trade
and fixed investment costs. Also comparing Figures 4 and 5 with Figures 1 and 2 shows
that when relative quality is high, avoiding double marginalization (by vertically inte-
grating with the upstream monopoly) shifts the threshold value of input trade costs to
the right. That is, for a larger range of input trade costs, high-quality subsidiary sales
are more profitable than low-quality subsidiary sales. Similarly, when τ > t (the area
above the 45-degree line, which is empirically relevant especially when physical trade
costs are considered) vertical integration enables a multinational to manufacture high
quality in equilibrium, even for larger values of fixed investment costs as the threshold
value in the case of vertical integration (G6 given by Appendix A.7) is four times the
threshold value in the case of upstream market power (G2 given by Appendix A.3).
When relative quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently low such that u/u < (4−σ)/2,
Figure 6 shows that low quality subsidiary sales can emerge as the equilibrium outcome
(the shaded upper-right corner), especially when trade costs in final goods and inputs
are both sufficiently large such that (τ, t) >> (u − u) and fixed investment costs
are sufficiently low (such that G < G5, see Appendix A.7). That said, comparing
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Figures 3 and 6 shows that when there is upstream monopoly, this equilibrium outcome
can emerge for greater values of threshold fixed investment costs (as G3 > G5, see
Appendix) and for a larger range of input trade costs (as well as for a larger range
of trade costs in final goods especially when relative quality is not substantially low
such that (6 − σ)/4 < u/u < (4 − σ)/2). In both cases, however, the probability of
low-quality subsidiary sales increases with an increase in trade costs in final goods (as
both G3 and G5 are positively related to τ given by Appendix A.4 and A.7). That
said, it is also clear from Figure 6 (as compared to Figure 3) that avoiding double
marginalization by vertical integration not only can make high quality subsidiary sales
possible (see the area above the 45-degree line where τ > t and t < (u− u)), but also
manufacturing high quality in general more likely.
6 Concluding remarks
The trade literature agrees that there are large frictions against manufacturing high-
quality varieties. While the literature has already studied contract enforcement as part
of such frictions, another empirically relevant case, upstream market power has been
mostly overlooked. This study has employed a differentiated Cournot model with both
vertical and horizontal product differentiation so as to delineate the implications of
upstream market power in customized high-quality inputs (warranted for high-quality
manufactures) on a downstream firm’s endogenous foreign market entry mode (trade or
FDI) and product quality choice (via choosing a particular input supplier). In particu-
lar, motivated by the statistical and anecdotal evidence reported by the empirical trade
literature, this study has shown that upstream market power for high-quality inputs (i)
generates important frictions and renders production of a differentiated high-quality
final good costly, and (ii) has important trade policy implications for high-quality ex-
ports and subsidiary sales. The results have suggested that relative quality of the foreign
variety is crucial. For sufficiently high relative quality, both trade and investment pol-
icy (decreasing trade and investment costs) can be effective in promoting high-quality
exports and subsidiary sales.
Overall this study has led to new insights emphasizing the important role upstream
market power can play for foreign market entry and product quality. In particular,
building on the existing literature, this study has developed a theory model that takes
into account large frictions against high-quality manufactures and that endogenizes
both the foreign market entry mode choice and the choice of an input supplier (de-
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termining the quality of the foreign variety) so as to qualify and explain intuitively a
number of empirical findings on trade and product quality. The discussions have been
extended to the product quality choice of multinationals and FDI under upstream mar-
ket power, which has been overlooked by the related trade and FDI literature. In this
sense, this study significantly complements and contributes to the existing trade and
FDI literature.
Of course, whether upstream market power generating large frictions against high-
quality manufactures matter or not for a particular industry is, in the end, an empirical
question. Thus, to flesh out the role upstream market power plays in determining a
foreign firm’s optimal product quality and market entry mode choice, the model has
been extended to vertical integration such that the integrated firm avoids the double
marginalization problem. This has been also the standard approach in the existing liter-
ature. As might be expected, it has been shown that such a case would generate similar
results as in the related trade literature, and would favor high quality manufactures
across borders.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Comparing a multinational’s profits from subsidiary sales of different quality, given by




πFDIh (u, ·)− πFDIh (u, ·)
]
=
(2u+ (4− 3σ)u)((u− u)− (u− (σu/2)))
2(4− σ2)2
,
which is clearly negative for (u/u) < (4 − σ)/2 ⇐⇒ (u − u) − (u − (σu/2)) < 0.
Moreover, ∂[πFDIh (u, ·) − πFDIh (u, ·)]/∂t < 0 for any t < t = u − (σu/2), and at t =
(u− u)− (u− (σu/2)) < t, [πFDIh (u, ·)− πFDIh (u, ·)] = 0. Thus, for (u/u) > (4− σ)/2,
[πFDIh (u, ·)−πFDIh (u, ·)] > 0 so long as t < (u−u)− (u− (σu/2)), whereas for (u/u) <
(4− σ)/2, [πFDIh (u, ·)− πFDIh (u, ·)] < 0 for any t < t completing the proof.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Comparing an exporter’s profits from its sales of different quality, given by equations




πTh (u, ·)− πTh (u, ·)
]
=
(2u+ (4− 3σ)u)((u− u)− (u− (σu/2)))
2(4− σ2)2
,
which is clearly negative for (u/u) < (4−σ)/2 ⇐⇒ (u−u)− (u− (σu/2)) < 0. When











which is positive. Note that ∂[πTh (u, ·)−πTh (u, ·)]/∂τ > 0 at τ < u− (σu)/2− (u−u)/3,
and that at τ = u−(σu)/2−(u−u), [πTh (u, ·)−πTh (u, ·)] = 0. It is now straightforward to
show that, when (u/u) < (4−σ)/2, [πTh (u, ·)−πTh (u, ·)] < 0 for τ < u−(σu)/2−(u−u),
and [πTh (u, ·)−πTh (u, ·)] > 0 for u− (σu)/2− (u−u) < τ < τ . As for (u/u) > (4−σ)/2,
[πTh (u, ·)− πTh (u, ·)] > 0 at both τ = 0 and τ = τ , and ∂2[πTh (u, ·)− πTh (u, ·)]/∂τ 2 < 0,
and thus [πTh (u, ·)− πTh (u, ·)] > 0 for any τ < τ , completing the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The fixed investment cost thresholds are such that πFDIh (u, ·)−πTh (u, ·) = 0 at G = G1,
and πFDIh (u, ·)− πTh (u, ·) = 0 at G = G2, where
G1 =
(τ − ((u− u)− (u− (σu/2))))((u+ (1− σ)u+ (u− (σu/2))− τ)
(4− σ2)2
G2 =
(τ − t)(2u− σu− (τ + t))
(4− σ2)2
.
πFDIh (u, ·) − πTh (u, ·) > 0 when G < G1, and πFDIh (u, ·) − πTh (u, ·) > 0 when G < G2,
where G1 ≥ 0 if (and only if) τ ≥ ((u− u)− (u− (σu/2))), and G2 ≥ 0 if (and only if)














> 0, ∀τ < τ ; ∂G2
∂t
= −2u− σu− 2t
(4− σ2)2
< 0, ∀t < t
Note that the prohibitive cost thresholds are such that τ = u−σu/2 and t = u−σu/2.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 6
The fixed investment cost thresholds are such that πFDIh (u, ·)−πTh (u, ·) = 0 at G = G3,
and πFDIh (u, ·)− πTh (u, ·) = 0 at G = G4, where
G3 =






πFDIh (u, ·) − πTh (u, ·) > 0 when G < G3, and πFDIh (u, ·) − πTh (u, ·) > 0 when G < G4,














> 0, ∀τ < τ ; ∂G4
∂t
= 0
Note that the prohibitive cost thresholds are such that τ = u−σu/2 and t = u−σu/2.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Comparing a multinational’s profits from subsidiary sales of different quality (in the
case that high quality products are manufactured through vertical integration), given
by equations (3) and (9) shows that
πv,FDIh (u, ·)− π
FDI
h (u, ·) =
4((u− u)− t)((u+ (1− σ)u− t)
(4− σ2)2
,
which is clearly positive if t < (u−u), and negative if otherwise, given input trade costs
are below their prohibitive levels such that t < t = u− σu/2, completing the proof of
(i). Replacing t by c+ t in profits given by eq.(9) leads to a difference in profits given
above, in which t should be replaced by c + t (and assuming away prohibitive costs
should follow c + t < u − σu/2). Thus, in such a case, πv,FDIh (u, ·) > πFDIh (u, ·) if c <
(u−u)−t, completing the proof of (ii). Similarly, including fixed costs specific to vertical
integration in profits given by eq.(9) leads to a fixed costs threshold (e.g., C), such
that πv,FDIh (u, ·)− πFDIh (u, ·) = 0 at C which is given by the displayed equation above.
Consequently, πv,FDIh (u, ·) − πFDIh (u, ·) > 0 for fixed costs smaller than C, completing
the proof of (iii).
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 8
Comparing an exporter’s profits from its sales of different quality (in the case that high
quality products are manufactured through vertical integration), given by equations (6)
and (10) shows that
πv,Th (u, ·)− π
T
h (u, ·) =
4(u− u)(u+ (1− σ)u− 2τ)
(4− σ2)2
,
which is clearly positive for any non-prohibitive trade costs in final goods such that
τ < τ = u− σu/2. In the case that vertical integration warrants some variable costs, τ
in profits given by eq.(10) should be replaced by c+τ . In the case of additional variable
costs (where prohibitive costs would be assumed away such that c + τ < u − σu/2),
the difference between profits would be
πv,Th (ch, u, ·)− π
T
h (ch, u, ·) =
4((u− u)− c)(u+ (1− σ)u− 2τ − c)
(4− σ2)2
,
which is clearly positive for c < (u−u). If vertical integration warrants some additional
fixed costs (e.g., C), then this should be subtracted from profits given by eq.(10). In
such a case, depending on whether or not there is an additional variable cost (due to
vertical integration), either of the two expressions above will be the threshold fixed cost
below which exporting a high-quality foreign variety will be preferred over exporting a
low-quality foreign variety, completing the proof.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 10
Propositions 7 and 8 and Appendix A.5 and A.6 have already shown that producing
a high-quality foreign variety is optimal for any non-prohibitive trade costs for an
exporter, whereas a multinational prefers manufacturing high quality only if t < (u−u).
That is, so as to determine the equilibrium outcome, when t < (u−u), πv,FDIh (u, ·) and
πv,Th (u·) has to be compared, whereas when t > (u− u), πFDIh (u, ·) and π
v,T
h (u·) has to
be compared. This leads to the fixed investment cost thresholds such that πFDIh (u, ·)−
πv,Th (u, ·) = 0 at G = G5, and π
v,FDI
h (u, ·)− π
v,T
h (u, ·) = 0 at G = G6, where
G5 =
4(τ − (u− u))((u+ (1− σ)u− τ)
(4− σ2)2
G6 =










h (u, ·) > 0 when G < G6,
where G5 ≥ 0 if (and only if) τ ≥ (u−u), and G6 ≥ 0 if (and only if) τ ≥ t, completing














> 0, ∀τ < τ ; ∂G6
∂t
= −4(2u− σu− 2t)
(4− σ2)2
< 0, ∀t < t
Note that the prohibitive cost thresholds are such that τ = u−σu/2 and t = u−σu/2.
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